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Introduction
Health technology assessment (HTA) has a long history in the
United Kingdom. The ﬁrst study undertaken to inform a central
policy decision was the economic evaluation of screening for
tuberculosis using mass miniature radiography [1]. Another
well-known study was the evaluation of the heart transplant
program, commissioned by the Department (i.e., Ministry) of
Health (DH) to decide whether to expand heart transplant
facilities [2].
Health technology assessment expanded rapidly in the 1990s,
following the decision to spend up to 1.5% of the National
Health Service (NHS) budget on research and development
(R&D). The HTA program, which commenced in 1993, became
one of the largest R&D programs and this led to the establish-
ment of the National Coordinating Centre for Health Tech-
nology Assessment (NCCHTA) in June 1996. The Centre
commissions and coordinates a wide-ranging program of
primary and secondary research in HTA.
However, the international proﬁle of HTA in the United
Kingdom greatly increased with the establishment of the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1999,
renamed the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excel-
lence in 2005. Here the difference was that not only were HTAs
to be conducted, but the results would be used in developing
guidance for the NHS on the use of health technologies. Such has
been the impact of NICE, both in the UK and beyond, that the
Institute’s activities have become synonymous with the conduct
of HTA in the United Kingdom. Therefore, this article will focus
mainly on the activities of NICE, given in Section I, discussing
NICE’s major achievements given in Section II, major issues
unresolved given in Section III, and lessons for other jurisdictions
given in Section IV.
SECTION I: NICE’S ACTIVITIES IN HTA
In broad terms, NICE serves as an “arms-length” organization
that provides national guidance on the promotion of good health
and the prevention and treatment of ill health. NICE’s remit is to
consider both clinical and cost-effectiveness in developing its
guidance. When it was established and during the bulk of its
existence, NICE has produced three types of guidance: technol-
ogy appraisals, clinical guidelines, and interventional procedures.
However, as a result of the DH’s 2004 ongoing review of its
various arms-length bodies, NICE also assumed the responsibili-
ties of the Health Development Agency in mid-2005, which
provided the Institute with authority to develop guidance on
public health interventions or programs.
Overall, NICE guidance is advisory and much is left to local
discretion, in terms of its adoption and implementation.
However, as of January 2005, technology appraisals were sup-
ported by mandate, in that the NHS in England and Wales are
now legally obligated to provide funding for medicines and treat-
ments recommended by NICE. Speciﬁcally, if NICE guidance
supports that a particular technology be made available by the
NHS to a certain patient group(s), then associated health-care
organizations are obligated to implement such recommendations
within 3 months from the date the guidance is issued [3]. The
mandate is a result, in part, of the well-publicized “postcode
lottery” debates around disparate funding of treatments from
location to location.
Although all aspects of NICE’s work involves an element of
HTA, it is the technology appraisal program—coordinated by
NICE’s Centre for Health Technology Evaluation—which has
attracted the most interest and debate. The Centre develops
guidance on the use of new and existing medicines, treatments,
and procedures within the NHS. As a result of a public consul-
tation process in mid-2006, NICE was given responsibility for
the initial stages of the topic selection process on behalf of the
DH. Speciﬁcally, the stated criteria include [4]:
1. Burden of disease (population affected, morbidity,
mortality).
2. Resource impact (cost impact on the NHS or the public
sector).
3. Clinical and policy importance (whether the topic falls
within a government priority area).
4. Presence of inappropriate variation in practice.
5. Potential factors affecting the timeliness for the guidance to
be produced (degree of urgency, relevancy of guideline at
the expected date of delivery).
6. Likelihood of guidance having an impact on public health
and quality of life, reduction in health inequalities, or the
delivery of quality programs or interventions.
NICE often commissions an independent academic center or
centers, called technology assessment groups, to prepare assess-
ment reports for consideration by the technology appraisal
committee (TAC). The TAC is an independent entity with mem-
bership drawn from the NHS, patient organizations, academia,
and industry, and is the primary decision-making body in the
production of guidance on new health technologies. Members
are typically appointed for a 3-year term, and allocated to one of
three branches within the committee. Although the TAC repre-
sents the views of its varied membership, its advice is intended to
be separate from any vested interests.
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In addition to the aforementioned, the Centre confers with
various “consultee organizations,” ranging from national patient
groups, health professional bodies, and manufacturers of the
technology in review. Such entities are able to submit evidence
during the evaluation process, comment on the appraisal docu-
ments, and can appeal against the TAC’s ﬁnal recommendations.
Moreover, the Centre relies on “commentator organizations,”
which are represented by manufacturers of comparator products,
NHS Quality Improvement Scotland, and research groups
working in the relevant topic area. These bodies can comment on
evidence and other documents used or produced by the appraisal
process, but cannot submit evidence.
NICE’s standard approach to technology appraisal, now
called multiple technology appraisals (MTAs), takes 54 weeks
from initiation of the process to issuing of guidance. Key features
of the process are scoping of the topic, which now includes a
scoping workshop involving the manufacturers and other key
consultees, a company submission, and an independent technol-
ogy assessment report (TAR) by one of the assessment groups
mentioned earlier. The TAR normally includes a systematic
review of the clinical literature and an economic model, and can
be quite extensive, especially because more than one technology
is being assessed. The report and any other relevant evidence are
then considered by the technology appraisal committee and an
appraisal consultation document (ACD) is issued. Consultees are
then given an opportunity to comment before the ﬁnal appraisal
determination (FAD) is issued, following a second discussion by
the appraisal committee. Consultees then have the opportunity to
appeal, in which case an appeal hearing takes place. If no appeal
is launched, the guidance is issued to the NHS within 6 weeks.
In addition to the aforementioned appraisal procedure, NICE
developed a single-technology appraisal (STA) process in 2005
for the review of single technologies for a sole indication. This
was introduced in response to criticisms surrounding the length
of time taken by the MTA process. The STA process is similar to
that of the full MTA appraisal process, as previously described.
However, in terms of the former, only evidence submitted by the
manufacturer is formally considered in the independent review.
Moreover, formal consultation procedures take place only if the
appraisal committee’s preliminary recommendations are sub-
stantially more restrictive than the terms of the licensed indica-
tion of the product in appraisal [5]. The timelines for the STA
process also differ. Speciﬁcally, STAs require less time to produce
the guidance, approximately 39 weeks from initiation of the
appraisal to publication [5]. However, the timeline for STAs is
not substantially compressed and with any delays in the appraisal
or appeals, it could approach the duration required for an MTA.
To date, the STA process has been applied only to drugs, mainly
cancer drugs, but is increasingly being employed in other disease
areas.
NICE’s new STA process is similar to the one that has been in
operation in Scotland for several years. Here, if a company
wishes guidance on the use of its drug to be issued, it submits a
dossier to the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC). The dossier
is then evaluated by the Consortium’s assessors and guidance
issued. There has been some interest in comparing and contrast-
ing the costs and outcomes (in terms of decisions) of the English
and Scottish approaches [6].
SECTION II: MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF
NICE
Methodological Rigor
Most commentators agree that the approach to HTA followed by
NICE is fairly rigorous. First, both company submissions and the
TARs conducted by the independent assessment groups are
expected to conform to a clear set of methodological guidelines
set forth by NICE [7]. The guidelines embody the “reference
case” principle [8], whereby any analytic approach is permis-
sible, as long as one of the analyses performed corresponds to the
reference case. The reference case encourages consistency and
compatibility of the studies submitted to NICE.
NICE’s methodological guidelines embody most of the fea-
tures found in other international guidelines, such as those exist-
ing in Australia and Canada [9,10]. The most contentious aspects
of the current guidelines are the following.
Perspective on costs. Costs are limited, in the primary analysis,
to NHS and personal social services costs only. This is embodied
in the remit given to NICE by the DH, which is to advise on the
best use of the NHS budget. However, in the case of the appraisal
of public health programs, the perspective has been broadened to
consider costs falling on other public sector budgets. This leads
to the rather perverse situation that a (public health) appraisal of
an educational program to reduce substance abuse could con-
sider the potential reductions in criminal justice costs, whereas
the (technology) appraisal of a drug maintenance program for
heroin addicts could not.
QALYs as the measure of health gain. NICE insists on the pre-
sentation of QALYs and then uses these in the calculation of an
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. This has been criticized on
two grounds: ﬁrst, that there are methodological problems with
QALYs; and second, that the QALY does not fully capture the
social value of health-care interventions (this is discussed further
in the following discussion).
Subgroup analysis. NICE is often keen to analyze costs and
effects by patient sub-group, even if the original clinical studies
were not powered to assess such differences. This is in conﬂict
with the principles of clinical trial design, but NICE argues that
as long as the uncertainty around such estimates is adequately
characterized, it is better to have these analyses than not. It is
certainly true that much of NICE’s guidance restricts the use of
health technologies only to those subgroups of the patient popu-
lation for whom this is cost-effective, rather than rejecting the
technology altogether.
Probabilistic Sensitivity Analyses (PSA). Although everyone
agrees that parameter uncertainty needs to be addressed in eco-
nomic evaluations, there has been criticism of NICE’s insistence
on PSA. The main concerns are that the multivariate uncertainties
are not readily speciﬁed and that there could be restrictions on the
use of some types of models because of the computational difﬁ-
culties of conducting PSAs. NICE’s view is that PSA is the best
approach to characterizing parameter uncertainty and that prac-
tical problems should not compromise this principle. However,
the Institute has accepted studies that do not have a full PSA.
The second way that NICE has promoted methodological
rigor is through its commissioning of independent analyses by the
independent assessment groups. For a full MTA, the studies
incorporate both a full systematic review and a de novo eco-
nomic model. All of the TARs are subject to peer-review and
are published (excluding any data that are commercial-in-
conﬁdence) in the NCCHTA’s publication, Health Technology
Assessment (see: http://www.hta.ac.uk/project/htapubs.asp).
However, NICE has run into criticisms over the length of time
these more detailed assessments take. There is also conﬂicting
evidence on whether the additional methodological rigor is jus-
tiﬁed, in terms of better decision-making [6,11]. Certainly, one
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result of this relatively resource-intensive approach is that NICE
has undertaken fewer technology appraisals than it otherwise
might have done [12]. NICE’s response to these criticisms has
been to establish the STA program as mentioned earlier.
Transparency
From the outset, NICE has sought to be transparent in its pro-
cesses and procedures. As mentioned earlier, all the evidence
gathered by the assessment groups are published, with the excep-
tion of those data that are deemed commercial-in-conﬁdence
(e.g., unpublished clinical trial data). Also, in producing its guid-
ance, NICE gives details of the appraisal committee’s appraisal of
the evidence and the reasons for the guidance given. Both the
ACD and Final Appraisal Determination are posted on the
Institute’s website.
Nevertheless, in the recent review of NICE by the Health
Select Committee (of Parliament), several commentators felt that
transparency could be further increased [13]. First, it was felt
that NICE should open up the technology appraisal committee
hearings to the public, at least for the part of the meeting where
the evidence was being discussed (this is currently in review).
Second, it was felt that NICE should make executable versions of
the assessment group models available to manufacturers. This
was one of the issues successfully contested in the judicial review
of NICE’s reappraisal of drugs for Alzheimer’s disease.
Stakeholder Involvement
NICE has encouraged extensive stakeholder involvement in all
areas of its work, including HTAs. In the case of technology
appraisals, stakeholder involvement begins at the scoping stage,
where key stakeholders are invited to a scoping workshop. This
deﬁnes the precise question(s) to be posed in the appraisal,
including the clinical alternatives to be compared. These can
include alternative treatment strategies, whereby particular drugs
enter at various points in the sequence, as well as simple head-
to-head comparisons of two or more drugs.
Then, manufacturers have the opportunity to submit data
and analyses on their product to the assessment group for con-
sideration, and also have the opportunity to comment on the
group’s report prior to the appraisal committee meeting. All
stakeholders, including manufacturers, professional groups,
patient organizations, and the NHS, have the opportunity to
comment on the ACD and FAD. Finally, if they are not happy
with the FAD, key stakeholders have the opportunity to appeal.
Around 30% of NICE’s decisions have been subject to appeal, a
proportion that has remained constant over the years. However,
there are early signs that the proportion of decisions subject to
appeal may be higher with STAs.
As was the case with transparency issues (discussed earlier)
some commentators feel that NICE could do even more to
involve stakeholders. Manufacturers believe that there would be
much to be gained from early involvement, even before their
product is selected for appraisal. In particular, they would like to
have the opportunity to discuss with NICE its likely requirements
prior to making large investments in economic data gathering.
Manufacturers would also welcome the opportunity to submit
oral evidence to the appraisal committee, or to correct miscon-
ceptions. they argue that this would reduce the number of
appeals.
The other area where stakeholder involvement could be
increased is with respect to patient participation. Although every
NICE committee has a patient representative, these individuals
sometimes ﬁnd it hard to make an effective contribution, given
the technical nature of the process. It is hard to assess the extent
of this problem and it is likely that patient participation in
NICE’s decision-making processes is highly variable.
SECTION III: MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES
As might be expected, the advent of NICE has led to considerable
discussion and debate in the UK around issues relating to the
allocation of healthcare resources. Of course, many of these
issues existed previously, albeit under the surface. However, the
advent of NICE has made them more explicit.
Independence of HTA
Although NICE is classed as an “arms-length” organization,
there are accusations that the Institute is essentially following a
government, or payer’s, agenda. Indeed, to a large extent this is
true, because NICE’s remit is to ensure that the use of NHS
resources is consistent with the principles of clinical and cost-
effectiveness. Therefore, on occasions it is bound to issue nega-
tive guidance if a given technology, or its use in certain
indications, does not meet the criteria.
Whether this constitutes more rationing of care than would
have occurred in the absence of NICE is open to debate. Because
the determination of the NHS budget is made by the DH largely
independent of NICE, it is likely that NICE has led to different
rationing, as opposed to more rationing.
Although NICE views the DH as its major stakeholder, there
are very few examples of government actions that impinge on
NICE’s work. Following NICE’s decision not to issue positive
guidance on the use of beta interferon for multiple sclerosis, the
Department, perhaps fearing a negative political backlash,
brokered a risk-sharing scheme with the manufacturers. This
allowed certain categories of patients to obtain, or to continue
with, therapy, at the same time limiting the ﬁnancial risk to the
NHS. More speciﬁcally, within the scheme, the government will
be entitled to a refund of part of the expenditure on beta inter-
feron, if the long-term beneﬁts from treatment are not as favor-
able as the manufacturers claim.
Although government interference in NICE’s affairs has been
minimal, the perception of lack of independence remains, as
evidenced by some of the comments made to the Health Select
Committee [13]. Therefore, NICE continues to seek to counter
this by engaging with all its stakeholders and by ensuring wide
representations by patients and health professionals on its advi-
sory committees. However, recently the Ofﬁce of Fair Trading
argued that the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (the
main ﬁnancial agreement between government and the pharma-
ceutical industry) should be abandoned in favour of “value-based
pricing” [14–16]. If this concept were to be embraced by gov-
ernment, there may be a role for NICE in the process. If this
change did take place, NICE would be perceived (unambigu-
ously) as being the government’s price negotiator for drugs.
Topic Selection and Priority Setting
Although NICE has taken over the role of topic selection from
the Department of Health, problems still remain. Several com-
mentators make the comparison with Scotland, where the SMC
considers every new drug in every licensed indication. This means
that the coverage of guidance by the SMC is much broader than
that of NICE, which prioritizes fewer topics. Some argue that
NICE would have more impact if it offered less depth and more
breadth [12]. Others argue that the rigorous assessments under-
taken by NICE are its major strength [17].
S10 Drummond and Sorenson
Timeliness
An issue partly linked to that of priority setting and methodologi-
cal rigor is that of timeliness. The concern has been raised that a
period of 54 weeks (minimum) to conduct assessments is much
too long. As mentioned previously, STAs were introduced to deal
with this issue. However, STAs only reduce the core assessment
time from 54 to 39 weeks and there are worrying signs that, with
a higher proportion of appraisals going to appeal, the average
time to issue guidance may be increased.
These concerns are compounded by the fact that, once a
technology is selected for appraisal byNICE, theNHS is less likely
to introduce it, pending NICE’s decision. The extent of so-called
“NICE blight” has not been formally studied, but does exist. Of
course, the technology manufacturers feel (in the case of drugs)
that all licensed products should be used until NICE issues guid-
ance to the contrary.On the other hand, theNHS is cautious about
introducing new technologies, which will be hard to remove or
restrict if they are subsequently shown to be poor value formoney.
NICE already makes recommendations for future research
when issuing its guidance, but these are only rarely binding on
the manufacturer [18]. However, the extension of these arrange-
ments, within the umbrella of a policy of conditional reimburse-
ment, is widely regarded by all parties as a promising way
forward. One manufacturer of a cancer drug recently offered the
NHS a “credit note” arrangement based on patient outcomes, in
order to secure a positive recommendation by NICE.
QALYs and Social Values
From the outset, NICE has been quite clear that the measure of
health beneﬁt to use in technology appraisals is the quality-
adjusted life-year (QALY). The theoretical and methodological
weaknesses of the QALY approach have been well-discussed
elsewhere [19] and will not be reiterated here. However, in the
discussions of NICE’s decisions, an additional issue has arisen,
namely, does the QALY capture all the elements of social value
relevant to decisions about the allocation of health-care resources?
NICE uses QALYs in a “standard” fashion in its technology
appraisals; namely a QALY is considered of equal value no
matter who receives it. However, some argue that society, if
consulted, would not apply this principle. For example, some
research studies indicate that members of the public may value a
QALY given to someone in a very poor health state higher than
one given to someone in good health. NICE has attempted to
explore these issues through its Citizens’ Council, a small group
of individuals chosen to reﬂect the views of the general popula-
tion [20]. As one might expect, the situation is not clear, although
there was a suggestion that seriousness of the patient’s condition
is a factor that people feel should be taken into account.
The Cost-Effectiveness Threshold
The use, or nonuse, by NICE of a threshold has been a continu-
ing topic for debate, because it would be clear evidence that
NICE rations care. Three criticisms have been raised: 1) there
should not be a threshold; 2) the threshold has been set at the
wrong level, or is arbitrary; and 3) different thresholds should
apply, depending on the nature of the treatments or patient
populations being studied.
Of course, the ﬁrst criticism is rather meaningless in that
whenever decisions are made whether or not to reimburse a
particular technology some assessment of value for money is
being made. Perhaps a more relevant question is whether the
cost-effectiveness threshold (or thresholds) should be explicitly
stated. In its early days, NICE denied that it was applying a
threshold. However, as the information on the decisions made by
NICE accumulated, it was possible to infer what the threshold
might be [21].
Subsequently, the director and deputy director of NICE dis-
cussed the issues surrounding the use of cost-effectiveness thresh-
olds and stated that NICE applied a threshold range, namely,
interventions with an incremental cost per QALY ratio of less
than £20 000 have a high probability of being funded, those with
a ratio exceeding £30 000 have a low probability of being funded
[22,23]. Rawlins and Culyer also discuss possible situations
where the upper bound of £30 000 might be exceeded, for
example on grounds of equity.
The main arguments for an explicit threshold are that it is
transparent and may encourage more consistency in decision-
making. Also, as happened with NICE, a threshold would be
inferred even if it were not explicitly stated. The main arguments
against an explicit threshold are that it tells us little about the
likely opportunity cost of adopting a new technology [24] and
that it provides guidance to technology manufacturers on the
maximum amount they can charge. However, even if there were
evidence that manufacturers’ estimates of the incremental cost
per QALY of their products were clustering around £29 000, it
would be important to know whether this was the result of
raising or lowering price expectations.
In order to apply an explicit threshold, the decision-maker
needs to know what the right level would be. NICE has never
claimed to know the answer to this question. Some of those close
to NICE have described the Institute’s decision-making process
as a deliberative one which, in essence, is searching for a thresh-
old [23]. Some research in the UK is beginning to tackle the issue
of the threshold level. In one study, Martin et al. [25] have
attempted to estimate the threshold level implied by decisions
currently being made within the NHS. Their conclusion is that
NICE’s threshold range is, if anything, a little on the high side.
Another major research effort has been launched to determine
the feasibility of estimating a monetary value of a QALY from a
societal perspective [26].
The third concern is that the cost-effectiveness threshold, if
one can be determined, may differ depending on the treatments
being evaluated, or the patient populations being studied. In part,
this links back to the discussion earlier; if the QALY does not
fully capture all the relevant elements of social value, it may not
make sense to apply a single threshold. This issue has been raised
in the context of drugs for rare diseases (i.e., orphan drugs). Even
if these treatments do not appear very cost-effective (i.e., have a
very high cost-effectiveness ratio), society may still prefer to
make them available, because many of the diseases treated with
orphan drugs are life-threatening or because it would be unfair
for someone not to be offered treatment just because their disease
is rare [27]. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that
valuing rarity per se may not make sense, in that resources could
be denied to patients suffering from more common diseases,
some of which could be equally serious [28].
Further research is needed on whether QALYs should be
weighted other than equally and whether society values
attributes of health care that cannot easily be incorporated in the
QALY framework. It is possible that factors such as the severity
of the patient’s condition, or the availability of alternative treat-
ments, could be relevant, but there is little evidence that these
feature in NICE’s decision-making. However, in one working
article, NICE did suggest that, pending further research, a higher
cost-effectiveness threshold ,around 10 times the existing thresh-
old,may have to be applied in the case of ultra-orphan drugs (i.e.,
those drugs for conditions with a prevalence of less than 1 in
50,000) [29]. More recently, NICE has initiated a consultation
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on whether there should be a higher threshold in the evaluation
of treatments given in the last months of life, such as drugs for
metastatic cancer.
Implementation of NICE Guidance
Several studies have shown that the implementation of NICE
guidance is uneven across the NHS [30,31]. This is despite the
fact that guidance resulting from technology appraisals is man-
datory on the NHS and should be implemented within three
months. This is particularly worrying because NICE was set up
to reduce geographical variations in the adoption of new tech-
nologies (so-called “postcode rationing”).
Several factors are considered to affect whether NICE guid-
ance is implemented or not. This include local political consider-
ations, lack of (health care) provider support, lack of knowledge
and understanding of the assessment process, media and patient
group pressure, lack of a broad systems approach to implementa-
tion, minimal reinforcement of compliance or accountability, and
poor ﬁnancial planning. Speciﬁcally, the Audit Commission [31]
found inappropriate use of allocated funding, lack of horizon
scanning for future NICE guidance, and poor planning. The
organizations reviewed perceived that NICE guidance was unaf-
fordable, but where robust implementation systems were in place,
funding was not found to be the biggest barrier.
One issue, relating to the lack of understanding of guidance,
is that the majority of NICE guidance on the use of technologies
is not a straight “yes” or “no.” Rather, NICE will often advise
that a technology can be used, but only for certain subgroups of
patients, deﬁned (for example) by their level of baseline risk, or
stage of disease. Depending on how clearly the patient sub-
groups can be deﬁned, such guidance may be harder to imple-
ment or to monitor.
In the recent review of NICE by the Health Select Committee,
several stakeholders argued that a more stringent monitoring
process should be implemented, with ﬁnancial sanctions for NHS
organizations failing to implement guidance. Problems over lack
of implementation are likely to remain. One of the difﬁculties is
that the UK NHS operates with global budgets for service pro-
vision and predominantly salaries for medical practitioners.
Therefore, it is more difﬁcult to use ﬁnancial incentives (e.g., fees
for particular procedures) to either encourage or discourage the
adoption of particular health technologies.
SECTION IV: LESSONS FOR OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
Because NICE is one of the more sophisticated and most studied
HTA entities, it is worth reﬂecting on whether there are any
lessons for other jurisdictions using, or contemplating using,
HTA. In general, one should be cautious about making such
inferences, because all HTA entities are creations of the health-
care systems in which they are based and their current structure,
organization, and processes may also be a result of previous
history with HTA in the jurisdiction concerned.
Nevertheless there are probably lessons to be learned from
NICE’s assessment activities. Given the political nature of health-
care decision-making, the methodological rigor of the assess-
ments has been important, since these are often challenged.
Therefore, any jurisdiction thinking of establishing a body like
NICE should consider carefully how such rigor can be main-
tained, by establishing comprehensive and clear guidelines for
conducting studies and by nurturing local skills in clinical and
economic evaluation in the jurisdiction concerned. Certainly
NICE developed such skills in its associated academic units, by
putting in place long-term contracts for undertaking independent
technology assessments. Although, paradoxically, this is now
somewhat diluted by the increased emphasis on STAs.
The use of independent evaluation groups was part of a
broader strategy of encouraging transparency in NICE’s activi-
ties. This strategy has worked well for NICE and jurisdictions
thinking of establishing similar bodies should consider how
transparent their activities can be made.
Linked to the notion of transparency, NICE has always
followed a policy of encouraging stakeholder involvement in
scoping appraisals and in commenting on draft reports. Although
stakeholders still request even greater involvement, this policy
has clearly been a success, as compared with what is observed in
many other jurisdictions. NICE’s experience is that stakeholder
involvement can be time-consuming and may also increase the
total time required undertaking assessments. However, it may
pay off in the long run, if assessments are improved in quality and
more often accepted.
In contrast to the assessment procedures, it is probably harder
to draw many general lessons from NICE’s activities in decision-
making (or appraisal). For example, whereas general recommen-
dations based on a single incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, and
the use of a threshold or acceptable range of cost-effectiveness,
may make sense in an integrated, single-payer system like the UK
NHS, they may not make sense in more decentralized systems.
Therefore, one would need to think carefully about the role of a
central HTA entity in a country where the responsibility for
providing health care is regionalized, or where there is a wide
range of public and private payers.
In such jurisdictions, perhaps the role of any central HTA
entity should be restricted to the production of high quality
assessments, which can subsequently be used by different
decision-makers. Then local decisions may differ, depending on
the resources available. If technology assessments are to be used
in this way they need to be adaptable to local needs. For example,
the economic model underpinning the assessment could be made
available so that it can be populated with local data. In countries
like the Unite States, where there are many private insurers, extra
thought needs to be given to how transparency in decision-
making can be maintained, in a situation where insurers are in
competition with one another.
Conclusions
NICE has been widely debated and often criticized since its
inception in 1999. However, it can claim several major achieve-
ments and still represents one of the more sophisticated attempts
to integrate HTA into the decision-making process. So is NICE
being nasty? Certainly, patients are being denied access to
therapy that they otherwise might have received. However, short
of making all effective therapy available, some mechanism needs
to be put in place to decide on health-care priorities. In the UK,
the approach followed by NICE has proved workable. Neverthe-
less, many important issues remain unresolved and NICE deﬁ-
nitely remain a “work in progress.”
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